Tags are keywords. I put tags on every post to help you find the content you want. Tags may be people (Dominic Raab, say), organisations (The Howard League, PRT), themes (women offenders, homelessness) or specific items (heroin, racial disparity, ROTL). If you’re looking to research a particular issue, they can be invaluable.
The Ministry of Justice responds to criticisms of its proposed payment mechanism for the new Transforming rehabilitation contracts and appears to be willing to make substantial changes. However, there will be no details until the “Invitation to Negotiate” stage of the procurement process…
19 September 2013 may prove to a momentous date in probation history. Minister of Justice Chris Grayling announced the formal launch of the competition for the 40% of the probation service which is being outsourced/privatised. Today is also the day that probation staff are told about their (limited) options of moving into the new National Probation Service or…
Last week the MoJ published the latest data on re-offending rates. These figures will be scrutinised more closely than ever given the upcoming privatisation of the probation service via the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation project.
Proponents and critics of TR will seek to find ammunition for their cause. And those seeking to win the new reoffending contracts will be delving into the small print. I’ve done some very basic analysis to try to identify key trends…
Will we see a real mixed economy with genuine local partnerships which include probation mutuals and voluntary sector providers of all sizes?
Or will a small number of large private providers win most of the reducing reoffending contracts by their ability to discount on price?
We should know the answer by the end of 2014.
Complexity is almost always the enemy of effective PbR because it inevitably results in unintended consequences. Concern about possible unintended consequences results in worries about gaming the system which, equally inevitably, results in additional measures being taken to address these concerns which involves further complexity which…, well, you get the picture. In this post, I want to make the case for simple, robust measures to assess how effective PbR schemes are in meeting their outcomes.
It’s great to be able to engage in the development of the MoJ’s proposed payment mechanism. However, the first thing that struck me was its complexity. Clearly a great effort has been made to design a mechanism that creates the right incentives to develop innovative ways to reduce reoffending. Will it be sufficiently transparent to stimulate the wide range of providers needed achieve real innovation or does it favour those with the deepest pockets, who can afford to do the detailed analysis necessary to truly understand the risks inherent in such rehabilitation contracts?
Yesterday the MoJ published interim reconviction figures from the reducing reoffending PbR pilots at Peterborough and Doncaster prisons. The final results for just the first year’s cohort from these pilots won’t be available until 2014 but the MoJ have decided to publish these interim results because of the “high level of public interest” which has been created because the new reducing reoffending contracts will be let on a PbR basis. The results aren’t especially promising…
The Ministry of Justice procurement team yesterday published its proposed payment mechanism for the new reducing reoffending contracts and invited feedback. There are three elements to the payment mechanism: Fee for service; Payment by results and Penalties for underperformance.
