Livestreaming CSA

The report starts by explaining how livestreaming technologies can allow people to share and view videos of child sexual abuse (CSA) with a perceived reduced risk of detection. Livestreams may be pre-recorded videos of abuse that are later livestreamed for an audience of offenders. Offenders may also entice children into using livestreaming platforms to self-generate child sexual abuse material (CSAM). They may also use livestreaming platforms to direct child abuse in real time.

The livestreaming of abuse often involves victims based in low-income countries, with offenders paying to view and direct the abuse from other parts of the world. This is also referred to as cybersex trafficking or live distant child sexual abuse (LDCA).

Livestreams may leave no stored file unless deliberately recorded, and abuse may take place through private or encrypted communication channels. Virtual private networks (VPNs) can also reduce visibility for law enforcement agencies and internet service providers.

Technologies used to detect stored child sexual abuse material (CSAM) may therefore be less effective for livestreamed abuse.

The scale of offending

Evidence on the scale of livestreamed CSA is limited, but available information indicates significant UK demand. The Philippines is a known hotspot for LDCA and receives 3,000 reports of suspected cases of online child sexual exploitation from overseas every month. It is distressing to report that analysis of suspicious financial transaction data from the Philippines (one of the very few countries with publicly available data on Suspicious Transaction Records) identified the UK as a significant demand country. The total value of the UK transactions was 50,608,799 Philippine Pesos (£670,000) between 2020 and 2022. This places the UK as the second highest contributor to OCSAE (Online-facilitated child sexual abuse and exploitation)-suspicious transactions to the Philippines, both in terms of number of transactions and total monetary value.

A recent analysis by the University of New South Wales found that 1.4% of a sample of 1,506 men representative of the UK male population (or 1 in 71 men), reported having webcammed a child in a sexual way. 

An expert in CSAE interviewed for this briefing said that “we do not know the true financial scale of this activity, other than it being massive”. They said that “we also don’t know enough about the facilitators of these activities, the proportion of alternative currencies used to transact, and methods used to hide or obscure offending.” They said this knowledge is important to decide the appropriate response and to measure whether the response is working.

Detection technologies and their limits

Platforms and internet service providers traditionally detect known CSAM using hash-matching, which compares potentially illegal files against databases of digital fingerprints, or “hashes”, of confirmed CSAM. Automated artificial intelligence (AI) classifiers can also identify previously unseen CSAM.

However, these approaches are less effective where abuse is livestreamed, not stored, or takes place through private or encrypted one-to-one communications. AI-generated CSAM creates further challenges, including increased pressure on law enforcement agencies and difficulties in detection and classification.

Offenders can also sometimes be identified through financial data. Payments for LDCA may leave traceable records even where the livestream itself leaves little or no technical evidence. Public-private partnerships between law enforcement agencies, technology companies and financial institutions can support the identification and prosecution of UK offenders.

Regulation

The UK Online Safety Act 2023 covers user-to-user communications, which include social media, messaging applications, video games’ messaging features, and livestreams. LDCA is typically broadcast on private or encrypted livestreams.

Under the act, Ofcom may recommend the use of a specific technology to analyse public user-generated content. However, it cannot do so for content communicated privately.

Ofcom has powers under section 121 of the act to require an online service provider to use a specific technology to tackle CSAM in private communications, where it decides it is necessary and proportionate. There are, however, a number of steps that would need to be taken under the act before exercising this power.

Other countries are considering or adopting different approaches to tackle livestreamed CSA, which may be relevant because LCSA often involves offenders, victims, facilitators, platforms and financial flows across national borders. Examples include:

• Australia is considering amendments to its Online Safety Act through a proposed ‘Digital Duty of Care framework’. These would require online platforms to take reasonable, proactive steps to prevent foreseeable online harms through a ‘safe-by-design’ approach.
• The Philippines’ House of Representatives has approved a bill to expand existing anti-OCSAE legislation to cover AI-generated and livestreamed CSAM. There are also ongoing discussions on a safe-by-design approach that would require companies to detect and block CSA images and videos.
• Malaysia updated the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017, expanding offences to include livestreaming and sexual extortion, and updating terminology and definitions.

Conclusion

We know that this hateful international sexual exploitation of children is driven by profit which means that many criminal enterprises are resilient to new enforcement approaches. At the same time, public opinion polls confirm that the majority of citizens in every country are deeply concerned and expect their Governments to take more effective action.

It appears, however, that the most effective tools are those which are built into phones, laptops and other digital devices in a way that means they cannot be turned off by the people who wish to exploit children by viewing this content. As we know, securing action by the companies who make this hardware has proved to be historically extremely difficult and requires international cross-government co-operation.