How can we improve probation performance?
Sixth and final post in my series responding to the MoJ’s consultation on the future of probation, setting outcomes and incentives.
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Sixth and final post in my series responding to the MoJ’s consultation on the future of probation, setting outcomes and incentives.
The MoJ has decided to stick to its decision to make PbR payments on both binary (reducing the proportion of people who commit further offences) and frequency (reducing the total number of offences) measures. However, providers can only receive the frequency payment if they meet the binary target – the so called binary hurdle remains in place.
There was also concern that there would be insufficient investment in TR to enable providers to reduce reoffending – particularly with the extension of probation to short term prisoners. Ideally, the payment mechanism should incentivise providers to take risks and develop new approaches to reducing reoffending. If these approaches are successful, society (through less crime), the taxpayer (less demand on services) and the new providers (PbR bonus payments) all benefit.
The Ministry of Justice responds to criticisms of its proposed payment mechanism for the new Transforming rehabilitation contracts and appears to be willing to make substantial changes. However, there will be no details until the “Invitation to Negotiate” stage of the procurement process…